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 Th e CEDAW: a holistic approach to women’s 
equality and freedom 
 Rikki  Holtmaat  
 [ Th us ] , regardless of a universal sex-equality norm, women’s reality is one of 
gross inequality . 1 
 Th e abolition of gender norms … would be the abolition of gender and the 
radical reformulation – perhaps beyond human recognition – of sexuality. But 
their reform could begin to make it less true that our society constructs women 
as inferior to men . 2 
 1  Introduction 
 From its title, it appears that the overall object and purpose of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW, further: the Women’s Convention or the Convention) 
is  the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women . In this 
chapter I will explain that this aim may be divided into three sub-aims: to 
ensure full equality of women before the law; to improve the de facto posi-
tion of women; and to modify gender-based stereotypes. In turn, these 
sub-aims relate to three possible political and legal methods to enhance 
women’s equality and freedom: i.e. through (1) guaranteeing women’s 
individual rights, (2) giving social support to women and (3) enhanc-
ing social and cultural change. Most of my attention will go to the third 
sub-aim and the corresponding third method and to the provision on 
which this sub-aim/method is based, that is to Article 5 CEDAW (further: 
 Th is chapter builds on various research projects and derives some texts from earlier publi-
cations that I have written in this area. 
 1  B. E.  Hern á ndez-Truyol , ‘ Out of the shadows: traversing the imaginary of sameness, diff e-
rence, and relationalism – a human rights proposal ’,  Wisconsin Women’s Law Journal  17 
( 2002 )  111 –62 at 145 . 
 2  K. Anthony  Appiah , ‘ Stereotypes and the shaping of identity ’,  Californian Law Review 
 88 : 41 ( 2000 ) 41–53 at 52 . 
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Article 5). Th is provision lays the basis for an approach to enhancing wom-
en’s human rights that goes beyond the well-known distinction between 
formal and substantive equality 3 and includes transformative equality. 4 It 
opens up possibilities to read the Women’s Convention as not only pro-
hibiting direct and indirect discrimination against women as compared 
to men, but as also putting an obligation on States Parties to combat sys-
temic or structural gender discrimination. 
 Th is interpretation of the meaning and scope of the Convention is 
based on (the draft ing of) its text, 5 and on an in-depth analysis of the 
CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendations, its Concluding 
Observations and its decisions under the Optional Protocol. 6 Contrary 
to pessimistic voices in the academic literature about the potential of the 
Women’s Convention, this analysis shows that, compared to a stand-
ard sex-equality norm, it has considerable additional value. Th at is, the 
Convention requires fundamental changes in society in order to create 
more room for diversity and freedom for women (and men) to decide for 
themselves what it means to be a woman (or a man). 7 On the grounds of 
 3  Th is distinction has dominated discussions within feminism and feminist legal theory for 
several decades. See, for example,  R.  Hunter ,  Rethinking Equality Projects in Law. Feminist 
Challenges ( Oxford/Portland :  Hart Publishing ,  2008 ) and  R.  Holtmaat , ‘Van gelijke 
behandeling naar Ander Recht’ in  E.  Brems and  L.  Stevens (eds.),  Recht en gender in Belgi ë 
( Bruges :  Die Keure ,  2011 ) 237–61 . 
 4  Th is term has been coined by Sandra Fredman. See S. Fredman, ‘Beyond the Dichotomy of 
Formal and Substantive Equality. Towards New Defi nitions of Equal Rights’ in  I.  Boerefi jn 
 et al . (eds.),  Temporary Special Measures. Accelerating De Facto Equality of Women Under 
Article 4(1) UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women ( Antwerp/Oxford/New York :  Intersentia ,  2003 ) 111–18 . 
 5  As far as the draft ing process is concerned, I relied on  L. A.  Rehof ,  Guide to the Travaux 
Pr é paratoires of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women ( Dordrecht/Boston/London :  Martin Nijhoff  Publishers , 
 1993 ) . 
 6  Th e documents that are produced by the CEDAW Committee may be found at  www.
un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/sessions.htm (up to the 41st Session) and at  www2.
ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/ (from 42nd Session onwards) (last accessed 8 February 
2013). I have studied all General Recommendations, all Concluding Observations from 
the 1st to the 44th session, and all Decisions under the Optional Protocol until the year 
2010. My main objective was to reveal how the Committee interprets the States Parties’ 
obligations under the Convention, most specifi cally under Articles 2f, 5a and 5b and 10c, 
which all cover the issue of (parental) gender roles and gender stereotyping. 
 7  See also Simone Cusack’s chapter about the CEDAW’s signifi cant role in combating gen-
der stereotypes in this volume. Th e argument is that the right to equality is very much 
linked to the right to freedom to choose one’s own identity, instead of being forced to 
adopt stereotyped and gendered self-images and roles. Th is aff ects men in a similar way as 
women. See  J. M.  Kang , ‘ Th e burdens of manliness ’,  Harvard Journal of Law & Gender  33 
( 2010 )  477 –507 . 
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this analysis, it will be argued that the Convention is not only dedicated 
to the fundamental principle of human equality, but also to the idea(l)s of 
human autonomy, freedom and diversity. 
 A diffi  cult question that arises in this context is whether international 
human rights law can eff ectively impose an obligation on States Parties to 
modify gender stereotypes 8 and fi xed parental gender roles. 9 Th e imple-
mentation of this obligation very much depends on their willingness to 
give up part of their sovereign powers to ‘govern’ the content and nature 
of gender relations (for example, through family law and inheritance 
law). In many countries the way gender relations are structured is closely 
linked to how States Parties see and experience their national identities. 
States are most hesitant to implement international law, and are especially 
inclined to openly contest its legitimacy, when such presumed identity 
factors are at stake. Before exploring these issues further, I will start out 
with some observations about the underlying human rights values that 
colour the interpretation of the Women’s Convention as a whole. 
 2  Th e human rights values that are incorporated 
in the Women’s Convention 
 Th e general object and purpose of the Convention must be interpreted 
in light of its fundamental principles and values, as declared in the 
Convention’s Preamble. Th ese point back to the Charter of the United 
Nations, which fi rmly declares that all human beings are equal in rights 
and in dignity. 10 Th is principle was elaborated in the 1948 United Nation’s 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stating in the Preamble that ‘rec-
ognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights 
of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, jus-
tice and peace in the world’, and in Article 1 stating that ‘[A]ll human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. Th ey are endowed 
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit 
of brotherhood.’ Th ese most fundamental principles of human rights are 
   8  Th is expression summarises the content of Article 5a of the CEDAW, discussed below in 
this chapter. 
   9  Th is expression summarises the content of Article 5b of the CEDAW, discussed below in 
this chapter. 
 10  In a similar vein, see the Preambles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (ICESCR), 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD) and the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) all refer to 
the Preamble of the UN Charter. 
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based on the presumption that  all human beings – irrespective of time 
and place of birth, national or ethnic origin, race, language, class or caste, 
sex, sexual orientation, disability or any other classifi cation that human 
beings can possibly construct between themselves and regardless of their 
actual diff erences– are potentially rational and responsible beings who 
have a genuine desire to be in control of their own lives. 11  Equality and 
 dignity mean that not subjugation but participation, not dependency but 
autonomy, not slavery but freedom are the key notions in this human 
rights value orientation. 12 It means that neither destiny nor fate, neither 
cultural inheritance nor religious prescriptions, but the autonomy and 
capacity of each human being to make one’s own life plan come true is the 
foundational idea(l) behind human rights. 13 Even to the present day, such 
freedom and autonomy are most oft en denied to women through a great 
variety of discriminatory laws and practices, beliefs, customs and tradi-
tions all over the world, which are based on gender stereotypes and fi xed 
parental gender roles. 14 Th e Convention’s Preamble recognises this, as it 
 11  Th is expresses the fundamental value of the inherent equality of all human beings, which 
forms the basis for the principle of formal equality in and before the law. Besides this, 
the principle of substantive equality has also received recognition in international law. 
In that principle, it is recognised that in fact all human beings are diff erently situated, 
that is, they occupy diff erent social, geographic, economic or other positions. At the core 
of the principle of substantive equality is the recognition of these de facto diff erences, 
and the idea of distributive justice, which requires that human beings should have equal 
opportunities to make something of their lives. 
 12  H.  Bielefeldt , ‘ “ Western” versus “Islamic” human rights conceptions? a critique of cul-
tural essentialism in the discussion on human rights ’,  Political Th eory  28 :1 ( 2000 )  90 –121 
and  M.  Winston , ‘ Human rights as moral rebellion and social construction ’,  Journal of 
Human Rights  6 ( 2007 )  279 –305 . 
 13  Although autonomy and freedom are most oft en interpreted in an individualistic way, it 
must be remembered that human rights protection also includes the protection of family 
life and national and cultural rights. Th e individual, in other words, can only become 
a human person within the context of family, culture and nation. See  R.  Holtmaat and 
 J.  Naber ,  Women’s Human Rights and Culture: From Deadlock to Dialogue ( Antwerp : 
 Intersentia ,  2011 ) at 96 . 
 14  In Holtmaat and Naber,  Women’s Human Rights and Culture and in R. Holtmaat, 
‘Article 5’ in  M. A.  Freeman ,  C.  Chinkin and  B.  Rudolf (eds.),  Th e Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women: A Commentary [hereinaft er 
 CEDAW Commentary ]( Oxford University Press ,  2012 ) , I discuss the concepts of gender 
stereotypes and fi xed parental gender roles (in relation to Article 5 of the CEDAW) in 
more detail. See also  R. J.  Cook and  S.  Cusack ,  Gender Stereotyping: Transnational Legal 
Perspectives (Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press ,  2009 ) , and Cusack, this vol-
ume. Men who do not conform to the culturally defi ned male gender role and identity 
also encounter discrimination on the grounds of their gender. See, for example,  D. S. 
 Cohen , ‘ Keeping men “men” and women down: sex segregation, anti-essentialism and 
masculinity ’,  Harvard Journal of Law and Gender  33 ( 2010 )  509 –53 . 
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expressly states that discrimination against women violates the principles 
of equality of rights and respect for human dignity. 15 
 3  Th e Convention’s defi nition of discrimination and its scope 
 Article 1 of the Convention defi nes discrimination against women as:
 Any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which 
has the eff ect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on 
a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, and civil or any 
other fi eld. 
 Most importantly, the Convention incorporates the standard that  all 
forms of discrimination against women that lead to an infringement of 
their human rights should be eliminated. Th e words ‘distinction, exclu-
sion or restriction’ are interpreted in an extensive way by the Committee 
and by academic commentators. 16 Such a broad interpretation of the 
non-discrimination principle indicates a human rights approach to com-
bating discrimination, 17 as opposed to a formal legal approach, in which 
a (symmetrical) sex equality or  equal treatment norm prevails. 18  In such 
a human rights approach, discrimination against women is seen as an 
instance of their oppression, 19 which, according to Iris Marion Young, 
can take at least fi ve diff erent forms. According to her, women experience 
a mixture of exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural impe-
rialism and violence. 20 Th is means that not only factual unequal treat-
ment on the grounds of sex and legal discrimination, 21 but also (sexual) 
 15  CEDAW Preamble, paras. 1–3. 
 16  See A. Byrnes, ‘Article 1’ in Freeman  et al .,  CEDAW Commentary . 
 17  Winston, ‘Human rights as moral rebellion’. 
 18  Th e CEDAW defi nition is very diff erent from the formal equal treatment defi nitions of 
discrimination that are dominant in the context of (inter alia) European sex equality 
law. See  R.  Holtmaat , ‘European women and the CEDAW Convention. Th e way forward’ 
in  L’ é galit é entre femmes et hommes et la vie profesionnelle. Le point sur les d é veloppe-
ments actuels en Europe ( Paris :  Dalloz ,  2003 ) 153–74 and  R.  Holtmaat and  C.  Tobler , 
‘ CEDAW and the European Union’s policy in the fi eld of combating gender discrimin-
ation ’,  Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law  12 :4 ( 2005 )  399 –425 . 
 19  See Winston, ‘Human rights as moral rebellion’, who states that one should keep in mind 
that all human rights law is meant to put an end to the oppression of certain people or 
groups of people by their government or by other people. 
 20  I. M.  Young ,  Justice and the Politics of Diff erence ( Princeton University Press :  1990 ) 40ff  . 
 21  See Article 2 and many of the substantive Articles of the Convention. 
9781107034624c03_p95-123.indd   99 3/25/2013   8:01:46 PM
Potential Added Value of the CEDAW100
harassment, sexist hate speech, or violence against women 22 should be 
ruled out. ‘Oppression’ includes hidden or indirect forms of sex dis-
crimination and structural or systemic gender stereotypes and gendered 
structures that are deeply rooted in the religion, culture or tradition of a 
particular society as well as in its laws and public policies. 23 Th e draft ers 
of the Convention recognised this and stressed in the Preamble that a 
change in the traditional roles of both men and women in society and in 
the family is a prerequisite for achieving full equality between men and 
women. 24 
 Th e Convention explicitly recognises the disadvantaged position of 
 women and (at least at fi rst sight 25 ) awards protection to women exclusively. 
Th is diff ers from so-called sex neutral or symmetrical anti-discrimination 
provisions in many international conventions, in national constitutions 
and in European Union law, for example, where  unequal treatment on 
the ground of (either male or female)  sex is prohibited. 26 Th e Convention 
acknowledges that in present day conditions it is mostly women who 
suff er from discrimination on the ground of their sex, as well as from a 
range of other discrimination grounds (i.e. they suff er from intersectional 
discrimination 27 ).  Recently in the USA, a discussion has been started by 
Darren Rosenblum as to whether the Women’s Convention should be 
‘unisexed’, that is whether it would be better to prohibit all discrimina-
tion on the ground of sex and/or gender, instead of discrimination against 
 22  See in particular CEDAW General Recommendations 12 and 19. 
 23  Th is means that all laws and legal constructs must be subjected to an in-depth gender ana-
lysis. See  R.  Holtmaat , ‘ Th e power of legal concepts: the development of a feminist theory 
of law ’,  International Journal of the Sociology of Law  5 ( 1989 )  481 –502 and  R.  Holtmaat , 
‘Gender, the Analytical Concept that Tackles the Hidden Structural Bias of Law’ in  Recht 
Richtung Frauen: Beitrage zur feministischen Rechtswisschenschaft  ( Lachen/St Gallen : 
 Dike Verlag  2001 ) 159–82 . A methodology for such an analysis has been developed in 
 R.  Holtmaat ,  Towards Diff erent Law and Public Policy: Th e Signifi cance of Article 5a 
CEDAW for the Elimination of Structural Gender Discrimination ( Doetinchem :  Reed 
Business Information ,  2004 ) . 
 24  CEDAW Preamble, paras. 13 and 14. 
 25  Below in this chapter I will argue that a wide interpretation of Article 5 of the CEDAW 
allows us to include men as well as intersexual and LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender) people who suff er from gender stereotypes and strict masculinity codes, 
under the protection against discrimination on the basis of this Convention. 
 26  Holtmaat, ‘European Women and the CEDAW Convention’, and Holtmaat and Tobler, 
‘CEDAW and the European Union’s policy’. 
 27  K.  Crenshaw , ‘ Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex, a black feminist critique 
of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory, and antiracist politics ’,  University of 
Chicago Legal Forum ( 1989 )  139 –67 . 
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women. 28 Rosenblum presents an important argument in an attempt to 
answer this question positively: the word ‘sex’ might be understood to 
include not only the male and female sex but all kinds of sexes, includ-
ing transgendered, intersexed and other diff erently sexed and gendered 
people. 29 To me, this is not a convincing reason to change the scope of 
the Convention. A prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sex is 
commonly interpreted in a binary or bipolar scheme in which the (pre-
sumably essential) male and female sexes are compared to one another, 
and where only one of the two sexes suff ers a certain disadvantage, the 
non-discrimination norm becomes applicable. Th e vast (feminist) liter-
ature shows the strong tendency toward assimilation to the male norm 
that is inherent in sex discrimination law as it has been constructed since 
the 1970s. 30 Changing the understanding of sex to include ‘other’ sexes as 
well might appear to be as diffi  cult and controversial as acknowledging 
that diff erences between men and women are culturally and socially con-
structed instead of ‘natural’ or ‘God-given’.  Th e Dutch (male) professor of 
Constitutional Law, Henc van Maarseveen, in an early comment on the 
Women’s Convention, congratulated the draft ers for the fact that it pro-
hibits discrimination of  women . Transforming the demand for women’s 
equality into a demand for sex equality, in his view, takes the sting out 
of the prohibition of discrimination because it soon will be used mainly 
by dominant, well-positioned men to demand whatever small ‘advantage’ 
women might have over them: ‘Th e person who has the power of defi ni-
tion, who succeeds at defi ning discrimination against women as sex dis-
crimination, takes the sting out of the matter and at the same time does 
not have to fear much from it anymore.’ 31 Th e Convention is rightfully 
directed at the elimination of discrimination against women, because to 
the present day it is mostly men who set the standards of behaviour for 
women in many areas of life,  32 most notably in respect to family relations 
 28  D.  Rosenblum , ‘ Unisex CEDAW, or what’s wrong with women’s rights ’,  Columbia Journal 
of Gender and Law  20 ( 2011 )  98 –194 and  B. E.  Hern á ndez-Truyol , ‘ Unsex CEDAW? No! 
Super-sex it! ’,  Columbia Journal of Gender and Law  20 ( 2011 )  195 –223 . 
 29  Rosenblum, ‘Unisex CEDAW’ at 125. 
 30  A summary of these discussions may be found in Fredman, ‘Beyond the Dichotomy of 
Formal and Substantive Equality’. 
 31  H. Van  Maarseveen , ‘Internationaal vrouwenrecht. Een afzonderlijk rechtsgebied?’ in 
 H. Van  Maarseveen  et al . (eds.),  Internationaal recht en vrouwen (Deel 1 Commentaren) 
( Zwolle :  Tjeenk-Willink ,  1987 ) 69–81 at 74–5 . (Quote translated from Dutch by the author). 
See also  C.  Smart ,  Feminism and the Power of Law ( London :  Routledge ,  1989 ) at 2 . 
 32  Although gender stereotypes and (separate) gendered roles for women and men also lead 
to ‘harnessed’ ideas about masculinity and to men being imprisoned in male roles and 
tasks, men at the same time make use of gender diff erences to dominate women. See 
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and childrearing, through fi rmly-entrenched laws and practices that pre-
cisely describe women’s inferior (and men’s superior) roles and oppor-
tunities in life. But men, to a great extent, also determine the culture of 
workplace relations, 33 the ways people operate in economic or fi nancial 
aff airs, 34 and the ‘culture of politics’. 35 
 4  Th e additional value of the Women’s Convention 
 In early feminist legal literature on international human rights law, the 
Women’s Convention was not welcomed as an important contribution 
for the advancement of the human rights of women.  On the contrary, it 
was oft en heavily criticised for having very limited instrumental value, 
because it lacks an adequate system of supervision and because there 
are ample possibilities for States Parties to make reservations. 36 Further 
points of critique were that the Convention only requires States Parties 
to take appropriate measures and does not impose clearly defi ned obli-
gations backed up by eff ective deterrent sanctions, 37 and that it does not 
Cohen, ‘Keeping men “men” and women down’ at 523, who distinguishes between ‘hege-
monic masculinity’ and ‘hegemony by men’. ‘Hegemonic masculinity … works to subor-
dinate both women and non-hegemonically masculine men. It subordinates women by 
defi nition, as hegemonic masculinity is associated with characteristics that allow men to 
subordinate women; it subordinates other men, non-hegemonically masculine men, by 
labelling their expressions of personhood as inferior to “true” manhood.’ 
 33  Sexual harassment very oft en being part of the culture at the workplace and on that 
ground being presented as ‘normal’ behaviour. See for example,  A.  McKinnon and  T. I. 
 Emerson ,  Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Discrimination ( New Haven : 
 Yale University Press ,  1979 ) . 
 34  According to feminist critiques, thereby causing fi nancial and economic crises and 
unsustainable economic development. See, for example,  J. K.  Gibson-Graham ,  Th e End 
of Capitalism (As We Knew It): A Feminist Critique of Political Economy – 10 Years On 
(Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press ,  2006 ) . 
 35  See, for example,  D.  Alexander and  K.  Andersen , ‘ Gender as a factor in the attribution of 
leadership traits ’,  Political Research Quarterly  46 ( 1993 )  527 . 
 36  See  H.  Charlesworth and  C.  Chinkin ,  Th e Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist 
Analysis ( Manchester University Press ,  2000 ) at 21 See also  C. I.  Nyamu , ‘ How should 
human rights and development respond to cultural legitimization of gender hierarchy 
in developing countries? ’,  Harvard International Law Journal  41 ( 2000 )  381 –418 at 391 . 
Nyamu discusses the fact that attempts by human rights activists to fi nd a legal basis for 
State responsibility for discrimination against women oft en fail because many (mainly 
Islamic) States have made reservations to Articles 2 and 16 of the Convention. 
 37  See, for example,  A. X.  Felmeth , ‘ Feminism and international law. Th eory, method-
ology and substantive reform ’,  Human Rights Quarterly  22 :3 ( 2000 )  658 –733 at 710 and 
 H.  Charlesworth , C. Chinkin and S. Wright, ‘ Feminist approaches to international law ’, 
 Th e American Journal of International Law ( 1991 )  613 –45 at 634 . 
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oblige States Parties to take positive measures. Charlesworth and Chinkin 
concluded that: ‘For these reasons, even the comparatively broad defi ni-
tion of discrimination contained in the Women’s Convention may not 
have much cutting edge against the problems women face worldwide.’ 38 
More importantly, the Convention was blamed for using a defi nition 
of equality in terms of ‘equal to men’: ‘equality is defi ned as being like a 
man’. 39 On the basis of a textual analysis, it was stated that the Convention 
requires a comparison to be made with a male standard, which means in 
order to get equal rights, women must assimilate to the male norm. 40 Th is 
(supposed) emphasis on formal equality misjudges the underlying struc-
tures and power relations that contribute to the oppression of women. 41 
 Summing up the critique, Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright conclude 
that ‘the Women’s Convention … is an ambiguous off er. It recognizes dis-
crimination against women as a legal issue but is premised on the notion 
of progress through good will, education and changing attitudes and 
does not promise any form of structural, social or economic change for 
women’. 42  Other commentators, like Lijnzaad and Burrows, did acknowl-
edge that the Convention covers a broad area and that it goes further than 
the elimination of (formal) discrimination as it also requires the elimi-
nation of gender stereotypes. Nevertheless, these authors also concluded 
that it is an ‘instrument without teeth’. 43 
 It is very regrettable and damaging that such outdated opinions about 
the limited value of the Women’s Convention are still echoed in con-
temporary academic literature, where authors repeat the view that the 
Convention might do more harm than good. Th ese opinions have argu-
ably been expressed 44 without any apparent knowledge of the practice 
 38  Charlesworth and Chinkin,  Th e Boundaries of International Law at 230. 
 39  Charlesworth  et al ., ‘Feminist approaches to international law’ at 631. 
 40  Ibid . 
 41  Charlesworth and Chinkin,  Th e Boundaries of International Law at 229. 
 42  Charlesworth  et al ., ‘Feminist approaches to international law’ at 634. 
 43  See, for example,  L.  Lijnzaad , ‘Over rollenpatronen en de rol van het Verdrag’ in  A. W. 
 Heringa ,  J.  Hes and  L.  Lijnzaad (eds.),  Het Vrouwenverdrag. Een beeld van een verdrag 
( Antwerp/Apeldoorn :  Maklu ,  1994 ) 43–57 and  N.  Burrows , ‘ Th e 1979 Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women ’,  Netherlands International 
Law Review ( 1985 )  419 –60 . An extensive discussion of the literature up to 2004 may be 
found in Holtmaat,  Towards Diff erent Law and Public Policy . 
 44  See, for example,  S. E.  Merry , ‘ Gender justice and CEDAW: the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ’,  Journal of Women of the 
Middle East and the Islamic World  9 ( 2011 )  49 –75 at 53 and 58 , who argues, for exam-
ple, that the Convention focuses primarily on equalising women’s status with that of 
men, and Rosenblum, ‘Unisex CEDAW’, who (inter alia) takes it that the Convention 
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of the last decades of the CEDAW Committee’s work, including the 
Committee’s dynamic interpretation of the Convention, 45 nor of the ways 
in which the Convention is sometimes used by the judiciary, 46 nor using 
any recent studies on the subject. 47 
 It has been thoroughly analysed and well documented for some time 
now that the Women’s Convention in fact off ers important additional 
value as compared to the (formal) sex equality approach that is predomi-
nant in many national, supranational (for example, the EU) and inter-
national legal systems. 48  Th is development of the interpretation of the 
Convention has been stimulated inter alia by a series of studies that were 
conducted in the Netherlands, 49 which in turn have inspired the CEDAW 
‘provides a fi rst step, but not a workable solution to inequality’ (at 113) and that ‘most of 
the CEDAW provisions follow a formal equality yardstick’ (at 137). 
 45  Which was extensively documented in Holtmaat,  Towards Diff erent Law and Public 
Policy ; Holtmaat and Tobler, ‘CEDAW and the European Union’s Policy’;  F.  Raday , 
‘Culture, Religion, and CEDAW’s Article 5(A)’ in  H. B.  Sch ö pp-Schilling and  C. 
 Flinterman (eds.),  Th e Circle of Empowerment ( New York :  Th e Feminist Press ,  2007 ) 
68–85 ;  R.  Holtmaat , ‘Preventing Violence Against Women: Th e Due Diligence Standard 
and Article 5(a) CEDAW’ in  C.  Benninger-Budel (ed.),  Due Diligence and its Application 
to Protect Women from Violence ( Leiden/Boston :  Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers ,  2008 ) 
225–39 ; and Cook and Cusack,  Gender Stereotyping . 
 46  See for example, the important study of Cook and Cusack on gender stereotyping and 
the way in which judges deal with that issue, sometimes with a call on CEDAW. Cook 
and Cusack,  Gender Stereotyping . A recent example of ‘good judiciary practice’ is the 
landmark decision of the Shah Alam High Court in Malaysia in the case of Noorfadilla 
where this Court deemed CEDAW directly applicable in a pregnancy discrimination 
case (Decision of 12 July 2011; on fi le with the author). 
 47  Although her article was published in 2011, Merry (‘Gender justice and CEDAW’) calls 
Bayefsky’s study  ( Th e UN Human Rights Treaty System: Universality at the Crossroads 
( Ardsley, NY :  Transnational Publishers ,  2001 )) ‘recent’ (at 52). Her most recent literature 
reference on CEDAW concerns Sch ö pp-Schilling and Flinterman’s 2007 book  Circle of 
Empowerment ; she does not quote any other material between 2001 and 2010. She there-
fore misses out on many other relevant publications in terms of the topic of her article 
(see, for example, the publications mentioned in this chapter). Rosenblum, according to 
his footnotes, hardly read any documents from the CEDAW Committee and sticks to 
a quite literal interpretation of the Convention, based on the text as it was adopted in 
1979 – as he himself acknowledges in footnote 24 of his article ‘Unisex CEDAW’. 
 48  Christine Chinkin, who has taken part in the project to put together the  CEDAW 
Commentary , has now fully acknowledged the Convention’s great potential in contribut-
ing to the enhancement of women’s human rights. Chinkin wrote the chapter on violence 
against women (VAW) in that commentary and was one of the editors of that book. See 
also  E.  Sepper , ‘ Confronting the “sacred and unchangeable”: the obligation to modify 
cultural patterns under the Women’s Discrimination Treaty ’,  University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of International Law  30 ( 2008 ),  585 –639 . 
 49  Th e Dutch government actively stimulated legal research in the area of CEDAW. See 
van den Brink’s chapter on the implementation of CEDAW in the Netherlands in this 
volume. 
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Committee to elaborate on a broader interpretation of the Convention’s 
object and purpose. In these studies it was recognised that the Women’s 
Convention not only addresses unequal treatment of women (as com-
pared to men) in laws and public policies or in policies of employers, for 
example, but also addresses other forms of gender-specifi c discrimina-
tion such as violence against women, polygamy and to the failure to pro-
vide adequate health care to women, both in public and private life. 50 It 
was found that the Convention admits to the existence of the unequal 
power relations between the sexes by taking an asymmetrical approach 
to discrimination, that it is quite unique in its recognition of the persist-
ently damaging role of gender stereotypes, and that it entails a broad, 
encompassing approach to the principle of equality between the sexes, 
not only requiring formal and substantive equality but also striving for 
transformative equality. In the remaining part of this chapter I will con-
centrate on the Convention’s role in combating gender stereotypes and in 
enhancing transformative equality. 
 5  Th e triple approach to equality in the Women’s Convention 
 On the basis of an analysis of the nature and structure of the Convention 
by an independent commission of experts, 51 in 1998 the Dutch govern-
ment adopted the view that the Convention’s overall aim to eliminate 
all forms of discrimination against women can be divided into three 
sub-aims. 52 Th e CEDAW Committee, in its Concluding Observations 
on the second and third Country Reports of the Netherlands, stated in 
2001 that it appreciated this work and in the same document subscribed 
 50  See the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendations 12, 19, 21 and 24. 
 51  See  L. S.  Groenman  et al .,  Het vrouwenverdrag in Nederland anno 1997 ( Th e Hague : 
 Ministerie van SZW ,  1997 ) . Th e Groenman Commission (named aft er its chair) was 
installed by the Dutch government to write a report about the implementation of the 
Convention in the Netherlands. Th e present author was a member of this Commission. 
Th eir report was submitted to the Second Chamber of Parliament in 1998. A translation 
in English of the main chapters of this report is included as an appendix in Holtmaat, 
 Towards Diff erent Law and Public Policy . Th e Commission based itself on the historical 
background and a textual analysis of the Convention, on the General Recommendations 
and Concluding Comments of the Committee, and on the relevant legal literature up to 
the year 1996. 
 52  Th is position was confi rmed in the second and third Country Reports of the Netherlands 
to the CEDAW Committee (submitted in 2000, discussed by the CEDAW Committee in 
2001). 
9781107034624c03_p95-123.indd   105 3/25/2013   8:01:47 PM
Potential Added Value of the CEDAW106
to the Dutch analysis of the Convention’s threefold aims. 53  In its General 
Recommendation No. 25 on temporary special measures on the ground 
of Article 4(1), adopted in January 2004, 54 the Committee confi rmed that 
the object and purpose of the Convention is three-fold.:
 1.  to ensure full equality of women before the law and protection against 
discrimination in the public as well as the private sphere; 
 2.  to improve the de facto position of women; and 
 3.  to address prevailing gender relations and the persistence of 
gender-based stereotypes. 
 Th ese three purposes refl ect a threefold interpretation of the fundamental 
principle of equality.  Full equality between men and women , a principle to 
which the Convention refers in many of its Articles, means much more 
than equality before and in the law. Of course, Article 2 makes it unam-
biguously clear that women have equal rights under the law and should 
not be treated diff erently purely  because they are women. Women have 
the  right to formal equality .  In addition, the Convention in its Articles 
3, 4 and 24 makes it clear that all appropriate measures need to be taken 
in order to achieve women’s de facto equality with men. Th is means that 
sometimes (in the language of Article 4) temporary special measures 
are necessary. With the inclusion of the right to  substantive equality , the 
Convention acknowledges that individual human beings, through place 
of birth, mental and physical capacities, wealth, development of the coun-
try, discrimination and a whole range of other factors, in fact have very 
diff erent positions and possibilities in life. Women, in many cultures 
around the world, are in a position of inequality and oppression not only 
because of physical or biological diff erences, but also because of persistent 
political, social, economic and cultural discrimination against them. 
 Th e third-mentioned objective of the Convention, that is addressing 
prevailing gender relations and the persistence of gender-based stereo-
types, is laid down in Article 5, which provides that:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures:
 (a)  To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and 
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and 
 53  25th Session of the CEDAW Committee, July 2001, A/56/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 512 and 513, 
para. 196. 
 54  CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 25 on Article 4, para. 1, of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, on tem-
porary special measures (Th irteenth Session, 2004), paras. 6 and 7. 
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customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the 
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped 
roles for men and women; 
 (b)  To ensure that family education includes a proper understanding of 
maternity as a social function and the recognition of the common 
responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and development 
of their children, it being understood that the interest of the children 
is the primordial consideration in all cases. 55 
 In short, the Article, in its two parts, calls for the modifi cation of gen-
der stereotypes and fi xed parental gender roles. 56 It should be read in 
conjunction with Article 2(f), which requires that States Parties ‘take all 
appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing 
laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination 
against women’.  Rebecca Cook writes that these Articles combined mean 
that States Parties are obliged to:
 reform personal status laws and to confront practices, for instance of reli-
gious institutions, that, while claiming to regard the sexes as diff erent but 
equal, in eff ect preclude women from senior levels of authority and infl u-
ence. Th ese articles strongly reinforce the commitment to eliminate all 
forms of discrimination, since many pervasive forms of discrimination 
against women rest not on law as such but on legally tolerated customs 
and practices of national institutions. 57 
 According to the CEDAW Committee, Article 5 means that the Convention 
acknowledges that gender stereotypes and fi xed parental gender roles 
‘aff ect women not only through individual acts by individuals but also 
in law, and legal and societal structures and institutions’. 58 Th erefore, the 
Convention not only addresses  personal convictions ,  cultural practices 
and  traditional values , but also addresses the  systemic and structural dis-
crimination against women that is embedded in the country’s laws and 
 55  Th e Article is part of the fi rst section of the Convention, which contains the general obli-
gations for the States Parties. Th ese norms are to be regarded on their own merits, but 
they are also indicative for the interpretation of all other Articles of the Convention. 
 56  See Holtmaat, ‘Article 5’ for a more extensive analysis of the content and scope of this 
Article. 
 57  R. J.  Cook , ‘State Accountability under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women’ in  R. J.  Cook (ed.),  Human Rights of Women. National 
and International Perspectives (Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press ,  1994 ) 
228–56, at 239–40 . 
 58  CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 25, para. 7. See also e.g. CEDAW 
Committee, Luxembourg (2000), A/55/38, CEDAW/C/SR.446 and 447, para. 404. 
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policies, and – in order to overcome the structural discrimination that 
results from that inequality – calls for  transformative equality or ‘equality 
as transformation’. 59 
 It should be noted that, in this regard, the Women’s Convention has 
taken the lead. Aft er its adoption, similar provisions were included in 
many other international documents. 60 Some international documents use 
wording similar to that of Article 5. 61 A wide range of documents express 
the recognition of maternity as a positive social function and the sharing 
of responsibilities of parents as important values and approaches. 62  A very 
clear example may be found in the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR) General Comment 16, where it is fully acknowl-
edged that gender stereotypes and fi xed parental gender roles stand in the 
way of the fulfi lment of all of women’s human rights. 63 Th e CESCR defi nes 
gender stereotyping as a form of discrimination against women, 64 thereby 
refl ecting a wide acceptance of the CEDAW Committee’s analysis of the 
causes and consequences of discrimination against women.  Traditional 
gender roles, prejudices and stereotypes are seen by the CESCR and also 
by the Human Rights Committee (HRC) as important obstacles to the 
full enjoyment of women’s social and economic rights. 65 
 6  Article 5 and discrimination against women 
 Although Article 5 does not contain the word discrimination, and Article 
1, in which discrimination is defi ned, does not mention gender stereo-
types and fi xed parental gender roles, these phenomena can be related 
to discrimination against women in two ways. A fi rst line of reasoning is 
that, through the inclusion of Article 5, especially when read in combina-
tion with the Convention’s Preamble, the Convention acknowledges that 
 59  Fredman, ‘Beyond the Dichotomy of Formal and Substantive Equality’ at 116. See also 
further below in this chapter. 
 60  See Cook and Cusack,  Gender Stereotyping at 145–6 and 174. 
 61  For example, the Convention of Bel é m do Para: Articles 7(e) and 8(b); the Protocol to the 
Banjul Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa, Articles 2(2) and 4(d) and Articles 6 
and 13. 
 62  For example, the Preamble and Article 18(1) of the CRC; Article 17 American Convention 
on Human Rights (ACHR); UN CCPR ‘General Comment 19’ (1990) UN Doc. HRI/
GEN/1/Rev.1 para. 8. 
 63  UN CESCR ‘General Comment 16’ (2005) UN Doc. E/C.12/2005/4, para. 14. 
 64  UN CESCR ‘General Comment 20’ (2009) UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/20, para. 20. 
 65  For example, UN CESCR ‘General Comment 16’ (2005) UN Doc. E/C.12/2005/4, para. 
14; UN CCPR ‘General Comment 28’ (2000) UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10, paras. 5 
and 25. 
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gender stereotypes and fi xed parental gender roles  lie at the base or are a 
 root cause of discrimination against women. 66 In that way, it looks as if 
Article 5 is not an integral part of the prohibition of discrimination under 
the Convention, but that it merely tells us something about the ultimate 
causes of discrimination. 67 Secondly, in some views, the inclusion of this 
provision in the Convention, especially when read in conjunction with 
Article 2(f), means that discrimination, as defi ned in Article 1, also covers 
 prejudices and all  customs and practices that are based on the inferiority 
of women and on stereotyped roles for men and women . Th is means that 
these phenomena should be seen as discriminatory in themselves. 68 
 Th e CEDAW Committee sometimes points to stereotypes as  causing 
discrimination and sometimes calls stereotypes  discriminatory per se . 
Sometimes, both views are present in one text.  An example thereof can be 
found in a Concluding Observation about Burundi:
 Th e Committee continues to be concerned about the persistence of 
patriarchal attitudes and deep-rooted stereotypes regarding the role 
and responsibilities of men and women in society,  which discriminate 
against women . Th e Committee is also concerned that the preservation of 
negative cultural practices and traditional attitudes  serves to perpetuate 
women’s subordination in the family and society and constitutes a serious 
obstacle to women’s enjoyment of their fundamental rights. 69 
 It would be most helpful if the Committee, in a new General 
Recommendation on Article 5, would be more explicit and specifi c about 
the discriminatory nature of gender stereotyping and fi xed parental 
 gender roles. 70 
 66  Th is is also refl ected in the Committee’s appeal of 1986, where it remarks that it is neces-
sary ‘to overcome obstacles to equality  arising from prejudices, customs or practices’. UN 
Doc. A/41/45, para. 365, as cited by  M.  Wadstein , ‘ Implementation of the UN Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ’,  Human Rights 
Quarterly  10 ( 1988 )  5 –21 at 13. 
 67  For example, Wadstein, ‘Implementation of the UN CEDAW’, and Lijnzaad, Over 
rollenpatronen’. 
 68  ECOSOC General Comment No. 20, E/C.12/GC/20, 25 May 2009, para. 20.  S.  Cusack 
and  R. J.  Cook , ‘Combating Discrimination on Sex and Gender’ in  C.  Krause and  M. 
 Scheinin (eds.),  International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook ( Å bo :  Institute 
for Human Rights ,  Å bo Akademi University,  2008 ) at 222 . See also  R. J.  Cook and  S. 
 Howard , ‘ Accommodating women’s diff erences under the Women’s Anti-Discrimination 
Convention ’,  Emory Law Journal  56 :4 ( 2007 )  1039 –91 at 1043 . 
 69  CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observation: Burundi (2008), CEDAW/C/BDI/CO/4, 
para. 17 (emphasis added). 
 70  Th e CEDAW Committee issued General Recommendation No. 3 on Article 5 in its Sixth 
Session in 1987. See UN Doc. A/42/38. See also Cook and Cusack,  Gender Stereotyping at 
13 and 137ff . and Cusack’s chapter in this volume. 
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 7  Th ree strategies to eliminate discrimination against women 
 Th e three approaches to equality that were adopted by the CEDAW 
Committee should not be seen as competing ways of conceptualising this 
basic principle of human rights, 71 but should be seen as complementary to 
each other. Th e fi rst fi ve Articles of the Convention make clear that for-
mal, substantive and transformative equality lie at the basis of a simulta-
neously applied (holistic) approach to combating discrimination against 
women. For that purpose, three diff erent strategies could and should be 
applied by the States Parties to the Convention:
 (1)  a strategy of giving individuals a legal right (entitlement) to equal 
treatment before and in the law (an  Individual Rights Strategy ;  IRS ); 
 (2)  a strategy of providing social support to those persons or groups of 
persons who have least opportunities to lead a meaningful life as a 
human being, for example to those who are disabled or poor, and/
or who are discriminated against on the grounds of (inter alia) sex (a 
 Social Support Strategy ;  SSS ); and 
 (3)  a strategy to take away the structural causes of such discrimination 
through a process of social and cultural change ( Strategy of Social and 
Cultural Change ;  SSCC ). 72 
 Th is three-dimensional empowering approach may be illustrated with 
the example of violence against women (VAW). 73 When one examines 
the CEDAW Committee’s Concluding Observations with respect to this 
issue, it is clear that the Committee discusses the necessity of measures in 
all three areas. It pleads for legal reform, especially in terms of prohibiting 
all kinds of VAW; for putting in place protective and preventive meas-
ures; and for putting an end to all gender stereotypes and cultural and 
religious practices that sustain the idea of women’s inferiority to men or 
that in some way or another make VAW appear as an acceptable social or 
cultural practice. 74 
 71  Like the formal and substantive approach, which have been seen as competing inter-
pretations of (legal) equality by many feminist legal scholars. See Fredman, ‘Beyond the 
Dichotomy of Formal and Substantive Equality’. 
 72  See for example, Groenman  et al., Het vrouwenverdrag in Nederland anno 1997 , and 
Holtmaat,  Towards Diff erent Law and Public Policy . 
 73  See Holtmaat, ‘Preventing Violence Against Women’. 
 74  Th e ‘case law’ of the Committee on the issue of VAW has been analysed in great depth in 
Chinkin’s contribution to the  CEDAW Commentary . 
9781107034624c03_p95-123.indd   110 3/25/2013   8:01:47 PM
The CEDAW: holistic approach to women’s equality 111
 8  Article 5 of the Women’s Convention: the international 
legal basis for enhancing transformative equality 
 Articles 2–5 of the Convention, read together, instruct States Parties to 
adopt a comprehensive or holistic strategy to combat discrimination 
against women, aiming at formal, substantive  and transformative equal-
ity. 75  Transformative equality, or ‘equality as transformation’, 76 aims at 
changing society in such a way that those features of existing cultures, 
religions or traditions and of legal, social and economic structures that 
obstruct the equality and human dignity of women are subjected to funda-
mental change. Th is means that ‘States parties are required to undertake 
a social re-ordering of their political economy, and the cultural valuations 
ascribed to men and women.’ 77 Th is requirement has been adopted as an 
international legal obligation, where Article 5 ‘requires a modifi cation of 
social and cultural patterns of conduct’. 78 In other words, it calls for ‘a 
possible feminisation of culture, at least of the culture that is represented 
in the legal order’.  79 In this view, Article 5 embodies what could also be 
phrased as the  vehicle for cultural change . 80 
 Th is analysis of Article 5 was fi rst elaborated in the work of the already 
mentioned Dutch Commission of independent experts who carried out 
an in-depth study into the nature and scope of the Women’s Convention 
at the end of the 1990s. 81 On the basis of an analysis of the Committee’s 
General Recommendations and Concluding Observations on Article 5, 
the Commission held that besides addressing individual beliefs and con-
duct of men and women, this provision calls for eradicating gender dif-
ferences that have become an intrinsic part of a society’s social and legal 
structures and systems. 82 As a consequence of this, States Parties not only 
have to put an end to direct and indirect discrimination against women, 
 75  Groenman  et al .,  Het vrouwenverdrag in Nederland anno 1997 ; Holtmaat,  Towards 
Diff erent Law and Public Policy ; Holtmaat and Tobler, ‘CEDAW and the European 
Union’s policy’; and Cook and Cusack,  Gender Stereotyping . 
 76  Fredman, ‘Beyond the Dichotomy of Formal and Substantive Equality’ at 116. 
 77  Cusack and Cook, ‘Combating Discrimination on Sex and Gender’ at 207. See also Cook 
and Cusack,  Gender Stereotyping at 5. 
 78  Fredman, ‘Beyond the Dichotomy of Formal and Substantive Equality’ at 116. 
 79  Van Maarseveen, ‘Internationaal vrouwenrecht’ at 75. 
 80  Ibid .; Groenman  et al., Het vrouwenverdrag in Nederland anno 1997 . 
 81  Groenman  et al., Het vrouwenverdrag in Nederland anno 1997 . 
 82  Ibid . at 27. Aft er the publication of the Groenman report, the Dutch government ordered 
a follow-up study in which the content and scope of Article 5(a) of the CEDAW was inves-
tigated in more depth. See Holtmaat,  Towards Diff erent Law and Public Policy . 
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but they also have to reveal and replace the gender stereotypes that  under-
lie existing laws and public policies. 83 Th e Commission argued that:
 [I]f this does not happen, the implementation of full equality before the 
law and a policy to improve the position of women could sometimes have 
contrary eff ects. Th e concepts and assumptions that are currently being 
used in law and public policies are oft en coloured by gender stereotypi-
cal relationships and expectations. If these concepts and assumptions are 
included in new legislation or new policies, this will lead to unwitting and 
unintentional reproduction of gender diff erences. 84 
 Th e Commission concluded that on the basis of Article 5, States Parties 
are obliged to question the content of existing legal rights and duties from 
a gender perspective. Th is method or strategy ‘creates the possibility that 
dominant (male) norms are not assumed to be self-evident. In a number 
of areas, this can mean that it is not  equal rights or  equal opportunities 
that must have priority, but that  other rights must be developed or  other 
opportunities must be off ered’. 85 
 Th e CEDAW Committee adopted the principle of transformative 
equality in 2004, when in General Recommendation No. 25 it acknowl-
edged that measures must be taken ‘towards a real transformation 
of opportunities, institutions and systems so that they are no longer 
grounded in historically determined male paradigms of power and life 
patterns’.  86 
 9  Article 5 of the Women’s Convention: freedom, 
autonomy and diversity 
 Article 5 not only subscribes to the principle of women’s equality, but also 
expresses the principle of human autonomy or freedom, sometimes also 
phrased as the principle of diversity. Combating gender stereotypes and 
fi xed parental gender roles is not only required in order to achieve full 
equality of women, but also – and perhaps foremost – these cultural trans-
formations are required in order to achieve more freedom, autonomy and 
space for diversity for women. 
 83  Th is methodology is further developed in Holtmaat,  Towards Diff erent Law and Public 
Policy ,  Chapters 15 and  16 . 
 84  Groenman  et al., Het vrouwenverdrag in Nederland anno 1997 at 27. 
 85  Ibid . Italics in original. See also Holtmaat, ‘Th e power of legal concepts’. 
 86  General Recommendation No. 25, para. 10. 
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 Above, it was stated that the underlying presumption of the principles 
of human equality and dignity 87 is that  all human beings in principle have 
an authentic desire to control their own lives and are deemed capable of 
making rational choices for what it means to be living a dignifi ed and 
worthy life as a human being. Constructing fi rm (‘closed’) categories of 
human beings, and attributing a set of fi xed (oft en negative) character-
istics to those who are placed within a particular category, results in a 
deprivation of people’s control over their own lives. Th e gendered cate-
gories of ‘man’ and ‘woman’ or ‘male’ and ‘female’ are examples of such 
fi xed social and cultural constructions. 88 Th e  social and cultural patterns 
of conduct and  stereotyped roles that are addressed in Article 5, which are 
based on  prejudice and on  traditional or customary ideas about the inferi-
ority of women , deny the individual woman the possibility to be a person 
in her own right and to utilise all of her human capacities and capabilities 
in order to lead a meaningful life according to her own interests and con-
victions. 89 Gender stereotypes and fi xed parental gender roles therefore 
not only deny women the right to be treated respectfully as equal and 
dignifi ed human beings, they also deny women the autonomy to live their 
lives according to their own interests and convictions about their per-
sonal and unique contribution to sustaining and developing humanity. 
Women (and men!) have a fundamental right not to be confi ned to con-
structed (essentialist) understandings of femininity or masculinity, or to 
pre-fi xed (and fi xated) female and male parental roles that are entrenched 
in their culture, tradition or religion, as well as in the main social and 
legal institutions or organisations of their society.  In the words of Cook 
and Cusack: ‘Any law, policy or practice that aims to promote substan-
tive equality and non-discrimination must … honour the basic choices 
 87  Th e fact that the Preambles of the main Human Rights Covenants all mention equality 
and dignity in one breath already indicates that equality is not the sole foundational prin-
ciple of human rights. 
 88  Gendered categories are oft en presented as ‘natural’, ‘essential’ or ‘God-given’, that is, as 
 eternal and  unchangeable . I have discussed the role of gender-essentialism in Holtmaat 
and Naber,  Women’s Human Rights and Culture . 
 89   M.  Nussbaum ,  Women and Human Development. Th e Capabilities Approach ( Cambridge 
University Press ,  2000 ) . See also Kang, ‘Th e burdens of manliness’ at 478, who argues 
that guaranteeing the right to self-defi nition is the main objective of (USA) constitu-
tional equality clauses: ‘By the right to self defi nition, I mean the right not to be overly 
dominated by government in how I structure and give meaning to my identity.’ Th e right 
to be free from gender stereotypes, in that sense, should also stretch to men, according to 
Kang. 
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women make (or would like to make) about their own lives, and enable 
them to shape or carve out their own identities.’ 90 
 Th e CEDAW Committee has made it clear that a correct implementa-
tion of the Convention requires ‘the recognition that women can have 
various roles in society, not only the important role of mother and wife, 
exclusively responsible for children and the family, but also as an indi-
vidual person and actor in her community and in the society in gen-
eral’. 91 In this way, the Convention recognises that all human being are 
equal, have equal rights and deserve respect for their human dignity, 
but at the same time they may have very  diverse ideas and wishes about 
what they actually want to do with their lives. 92 Th erefore, the con-
cepts of individual autonomy, freedom and diversity are crucial for a 
correct understanding of the content and scope of Article 5 and of the 
Convention as a whole. 
 A similar ‘diversity principle’ lies at the basis of all anti-discrimination 
clauses in international human rights law and in national constitutions, 
which ban unequal and undignifi ed treatment on the basis of an indi-
vidual belonging to a certain ‘category’ or ‘class’ of human beings. Some 
categorisations, like those on the basis of race or sex, are deemed to be so 
invidious that they are subjected to a ‘strict scrutiny test’ by the judiciary. 
As South African Supreme Court Justice Sachs clarifi ed:
 [w]hat the Constitution requires is that the law and public institutions 
acknowledge the variability of human beings and affi  rm the equal respect 
and concern that should be shown to all as they are. At the very least, what 
is statistically normal ceases to be the basis for establishing what is legally 
normative … What becomes normal in an open society, then, is not an 
imposed and standardised form of behaviour that refuses to acknowledge 
diff erence, but the acceptance of the principle of diff erence itself.  93 
 For  all women and men this ‘diversity principle’ is as important as the prin-
ciple of equality per se. But it is important fi rst and foremost for women 
and men who do not conform to dominant legal, social and cultural 
standards about what it means to be a female or male person.  Women’s 
 90  Cook and Cusack,  Gender Stereotyping at 68. 
 91  CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Suriname (2002), A/57/38 (part II), 
CEDAW/C/SR. 557, 558 and 566, para. 48. See also CEDAW Committee, Concluding 
Observations: Uzbekistan (2001), A/56/38, CEDAW/C/SR.500, 501 and 507, para. 169. 
 92  Lijnzaad, ‘Over rollenpatronen’ at 57. 
 93  Judgment in  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v.  Ministry of Justice , 
South African Supreme Court 1999 1 SA 6 (CC), para. 143, as quoted by  E.  Bonthuys and 
 C.  Albertyn (eds.),  Gender, Law and Justice ( Cape Town :  Juta ,  2007 ) at 28 . 
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sexuality and their reproductive capacity are crucial for the construc-
tion of gender stereotypes and fi xed parental gender roles in all traditions 
and cultures and in all periods of human history up to the present time. 
Th is means that the construction of human sexuality as (exclusively)  het-
erosexual forms part of the construction of patriarchal gender relations. 94 
Th e most blatant transgression of the patriarchal female gender identity 
and her fi xed gender (motherly) role is the lesbian woman who chooses to 
renounce a male sexual partner and thereby also rejects the protection of 
the male head of household, and all other forms of male supervision and 
control of her life. 95 As was discussed above, 96 the obligation to modify 
gender stereotypes and fi xed parental gender roles is also of great impor-
tance to men who do not want to conform to their assigned ‘masculine’ 
identity and gender role. Beyond that, this obligation is equally impor-
tant for all ‘diff erently sexed’ (intersex, transsexual) people and people 
with a ‘diff erent sexuality’ (gay, lesbian and bisexual people). 97 Gender 
stereotypes and fi xed parental gender roles directly aff ect the lives of all 
persons who renounce traditional heterosexual and patriarchal feminine 
and masculine gender identities and gender roles. 98 Th rough a wide inter-
pretation of Article 5, all of these situations may be brought under the 
 94  See  J.  Butler ,  Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity , 1st edn ( London/
New York :  Routledge ,  1990 ) at 1–34 and 110–28 and  J.  Butler , ‘Imitation and Gender 
Subordination’ in  D.  Fuss (ed.),  Inside/Out: Lesbian Th eories, Gay Th eories ( New York : 
 Routledge ,  1991 ) at 13 . See  A. M.  Gross , ‘ Sex, love, and marriage: questioning gender and 
sexuality rights in international law ’,  Leiden Journal of International Law  21 ( 2008 )  235 –
53 . At 251, Gross summarises Butler’s position as follows: ‘the division in two genders as 
part of the institution of compulsory heterosexuality, (which) requires a binary polarised 
gender system since patriarchy and compulsory heterosexuality are only possible in a 
world built on such a hierarchised division.’ Real liberation or emancipation of women 
and gay and lesbian people, according to this author, requires ‘undoing gender’, instead 
of accepting the thus pre-fi xed gender categories and identities (as either being male/
female or heterosexual/homosexual). Another way of expressing the same principle is 
saying that a  transformation of gender and sexuality needs to take place. See also Gross, 
‘Sex, love, and marriage’ at 252. 
 95  Lesbian women being gang raped in order ‘to cure them’ from their outrageous ‘abnor-
mal’ sexual preference, is an example of this kind of ‘correction’. See for example, Report 
of the UN Special Rapporteur on the question of torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, Commission on Human Rights, March 2006, UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/2006/6/Add.1, paras. 180 and 183. 
 96  See text in footnotes 14 and 32. 
 97  Th at is, diff erent from the heterosexual norm and other than the binary male–female 
scheme. 
 98  Cook and Cusack,  Gender Stereotyping at 2. 
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scope of the Convention. 99 It seems that the Committee, although still in 
a careful way, is now willing to do so. 100 
 10  States Parties’ obligations to modify gender 
stereotypes and State sovereignty 
 Th e existence of gender stereotypes and fi xed parental gender roles is 
linked to cultural patterns, customary rules, religious prescriptions or 
beliefs and traditions 101 in a particular society or country. Th is means that 
the international obligation to modify gender stereotypes and fi xed par-
ental gender roles runs against the vested interests of many stakeholders 
in  keeping women in their ‘proper’ (traditional) place . 102 Oft en they justify 
or defend women’s inequality or women’s ‘diff erent’ roles with the argu-
ment for the freedom of religion or the right to maintain or preserve a 
particular culture. 103  Yakin Ert ü rk, the former UN Special Rapporteur 
on violence against women, has observed that: ‘despite the fact that the 
international community has recognised the universality of rights, iden-
tity politics and cultural relativist paradigms are increasingly employed 
to constrain in particular the rights of women’. 104  And in the words of 
    99  It is therefore not necessary to ‘unisex’ CEDAW, as is argued by Rosenblum in ‘Unisex 
CEDAW’. Th is author does discuss Article 5 of the CEDAW, but does not give much 
attention to its relevance for intersex and LGBT people. 
 100  In 2009 the Committee recognised that women may be discriminated against on the 
grounds of their sexuality, thereby possibly including their homosexuality. However, 
it seems to be hesitant to use that word or to use the word lesbianism. See, for exam-
ple, CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Guatemala, CEDAW/C/GUA/
CO7 (2009) para. 19, where it speaks of sexuality in general. It has mentioned sexual 
orientation and gender identity in CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: 
Panama, CEDAW/C/PAN/CO/7 (2010) para. 22. In its General Recommendations on 
older women (GR27) and on Article 2 (GR 28), adopted in October 2010, the CEDAW 
Committee has explicitly mentioned sexual orientation and gender identity. See  www.
iglhrc.org/cgi-bin/iowa/article/takeaction/resourcecenter/1235.html (last accessed 11 
January 2012). 
 101  In the following, I will capture all of these phenomena under the word ‘culture’ or ‘cul-
tural’ (without the quotation marks). 
 102  See Holtmaat and Naber,  Women’s Human Rights and Culture ,  Chapter 3 for the descrip-
tion of various stakeholders. 
 103  Th ere is extensive international legal and academic debate about the ‘clash’ between 
women’s human rights and the right to culture. See Holtmaat and Naber,  Women’s 
Human Rights and Culture ,  Chapter 3 para. 2.5. It is especially contested whether the 
right to culture prevails over women’s human rights or vice versa. 
 104  UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (VAW), Report on ‘Intersections 
between culture and violence against women’, 17 January 2007, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/34, 
para. 68. 
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the Independent Expert in the Field of Cultural Rights, Farida Shaheed: 
‘[T]he challenge is to ensure that the right to pursue, develop and pre-
serve culture in all its manifestations is in consonance with and serves to 
uphold the universality, indivisibility and interdependence of all human 
rights’. 105 
 Apart from individual men and women, heads of families and tradi-
tional or religious leadership, the State itself may be an important stake-
holder in maintaining the status quo of unequal gender relations. 106 Th is 
is because the construction of a particular cultural specifi city as regards 
‘true’ gender relations may infl uence to a high degree a State’s perception of 
its (presumed) essential national identity through which it distinguishes 
itself from other States. 107 Th e construction of particular gender identities 
and parental gender roles very much lies at the basis of the claimed iden-
tity of many (traditionalist) cultures, which are adopted and presented 
by political leaders or national governments as the one and only national 
culture. 108 National identities oft en coalesce around women’s bodies and 
incorporate racial or ethnic judgements. 109 Th erefore, States may have a 
great interest in maintaining or sustaining the existing gendered social 
and cultural order because this may (so to say) ‘keep the country together’. 
Oft en, such culture is expressed in rules and practices that deny women’s 
equality and curtail women’s freedoms. Th ese rules or practices are not 
just expressions of oppression or hatred of women, but serve to preserve 
and sustain the group’s or nation’s particular cultural or religious identity 
or even its very existence. Sometimes, a government goes as far as pro-
claiming that the prevailing gender relations within the family form ‘the 
 105  Quote by Farida Shaheed, Independent United Nations Expert in the fi eld of Cultural 
Rights, in her fi rst press Statement on 23 November 2009. See:  www.ohchr.org/en/
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=9619&LangID=e (last accessed 20 July 
2010). 
 106  As becomes apparent from the work of Ann Hellum, State resistance to women’s 
equality does not only come from the side of (religious) dictatorships in the South. See 
Hellum’s chapter in this volume and  A.  Hellum , ‘Th e Global Equality Standard Meets 
Norwegian Sameness’ in  A.  Hellum ,  S.  Ali and  A.  Griffi  ths (eds.),  From Transnational 
Relations to Transnational Laws: Northern European Laws at the Crossroads ( London : 
 Ashgate ,  2010 ) . An example of the ambivalent responses of States (and their organs) to 
the CEDAW is given in Ali’s chapter in this volume. 
 107  Gross, ‘Sex, love and marriage’. 
 108  Most famous in this respect are two crucial symbols of cultural unity in France, consist-
ing of the positive symbolic images of two women: Jeanne D’Arc and ‘Marianne’. 
 109  L.  Vollp , ‘ Blaming culture for bad behaviour ’,  Yale Journal of the Humanities  12 ( 2000 ) 
 89 –115 at 90 . 
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foundation of the State’. 110 A particular construction of gender relations is 
oft en embedded in the State’s constitution, in order for the State to distin-
guish itself from other States (e.g. from a State from which it has become 
independent, aft er a long duration of colonisation).  An example is Article 
41(2) of the Irish Constitution, which reads as follows:
 1°  In particular, the State recognises that by her life within the home, 
woman gives to the State a support without which the common good 
cannot be achieved. 
 2°  Th e State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not 
be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of 
their duties in the home. 
 Th is provision, according to the CEDAW Committee, refl ects a stere-
otyped image of the roles of women ‘in the home and as mothers’. 111 
Demanding that a State Party modify gender stereotypes and fi xed paren-
tal gender roles, as Article 5 does, in such cases strikes at the heart of the 
State’s fundamental understanding of its own identity. 
 From this perspective, it will come as no surprise that there is strong 
(most oft en implicit) resistance by States to implement international pro-
visions that oblige them to promote gender equality. Th is observation 
links up with important research fi ndings from which it appears that 
‘States apparently are more willing to negotiate, in other words seem less 
attached to their sovereignty, when material issues are at stake, as opposed 
to normative questions’. 112 Th e conclusion from this research is that ‘all 
States shared their reluctance to part with social and cultural practices’, 
and that ‘social values, more so than economic or military power, are 
the strongest aspects of global civil society’s challenges to autonomy and 
legitimacy’. 113 Th is is even more so when the construction of fi xed gender 
 110  CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Guatemala (1994), A/49/38, CEDAW/C/
SR. 242 and 246, para. 70. 
 111  CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Ireland (1999), A/54/38, CEDAW/C/ 
SR. 440 and 441, paras. 193–194. Catholic Ireland thus wanted to distinguish itself 
from Protestant Britain. See M. van den Brink, ‘Gendered Sovereignty? In Search of 
Gender Bias in the International Law Concept of State Sovereignty’ in  I.  Boerefi jn and 
 J.  Goldschmidt (eds.),  Changing Perceptions of Sovereignty and Human Rights. Essays in 
Honour of Cees Flinterman ( Antwerp :  Intersentia ,  2008 ) 65–83 . 
 112  See van den Brink, ‘Gendered Sovereignty?’ at 73, who discusses the research of 
 E.  Friedman , K. Hochstetler and A. M. Clark, ‘ Sovereignty challenges and bargains 
on the environment, human rights, and women’ ,  International Studies Quarterly  44 :4 
( 2000 )  591 –614 . 
 113  Van den Brink, ‘Gendered Sovereignty?’ at 75, quoting Friedman  et al ., ‘Sovereignty 
challenges and bargains on the environment’ at 611–12. 
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identities and parental gender roles lies at the basis of the national identity 
of a country, which is the case with many post-colonial and traditionalist 
countries that have strong links with certain religious beliefs or religious 
institutions. 
 From the very beginning the CEDAW Committee has acknowledged 
that a change of culture requires the strong political will of States Parties 
to do so eff ectively: ‘[M]embers emphasised that attitudes and behaviour 
could be changed if there was political will and broad support’. 114 Even if 
a State is willing to bow its head under international pressure or is volun-
tarily willing to accept international human rights standards, it may be 
very diffi  cult for it to eff ectively implement these norms in the internal 
legal order as well as at the horizontal level (i.e. between private parties or 
citizens among themselves). Th is is particularly so when an international 
norm requires a change of well-established patterns of conduct that are 
based on tradition, religion, custom or culture of many of its inhabitants, 
as is the case with Article 5. In order to be able to implement this norm, 
it is necessary that the State is  legally and  culturally legitimised to enforce 
or even promote such change. 115  Th e necessary formal legal legitimisation 
for the implementation of Article 5 can be found in the fact that the State 
has ratifi ed this Convention. 116 Aft er ratifi cation of a human rights con-
vention, a national government – be it monistic or dualistic with respect 
to the eff ects of international law on its own legal system – may argue 
(for example in its parliament, answering political opposition) that it is 
 obliged to implement the norms that are included in it. However, cul-
tural legitimisation, especially when it concerns equality between men 
and women, is far more diffi  cult to achieve because it requires modifying 
or overcoming very deeply rooted gender stereotypes and fi xed parental 
gender roles. 
 Th e eff ectiveness of programmes to modify gender stereotypes and 
fi xed parental gender roles will most probably be very limited if the State 
Party internally lacks cultural legitimisation or symbolic validation 117 
to do so; that is, if there is no connection with norms and values that 
 114  CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Ecuador, UN Doc.A/49/38, 13th 
Session (1994) para. 524. 
 115  See  C.  Packer ,  Using Human Rights to Change Tradition ( Antwerp/Oxford/New York : 
 Intersentia ,  2002 ) at 15 . 
 116  States Parties are obliged to implement international norms in good faith, and so on. See 
Cook, ‘State Accountability under the CEDAW’ at 229ff . See also CEDAW Committee, 
Concluding Observations: Portugal, CEDAW/C/PRT/CO/7 (2008) para. 29. 
 117  Hern á ndez-Truyol, ‘Out of the shadows’148ff . 
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(also) exist in its society, in particular with norms and values that women 
themselves consider to be of crucial importance for their lives and for 
the realisation of their human rights. States will certainly have diffi  culty 
fi nding this (internal) cultural legitimisation when there are important 
cultural majorities or even minorities that oppose women’s equality. In 
such situations women’s (equal) rights are oft en constructed as oppo-
site to a nation’s culture or to particular (minority or majority) religious 
rights. Th is makes implementation, even by governments who are highly 
committed to women’s human rights, a very diffi  cult issue. One of the 
strategies of advocates of women’s human rights could be to help the 
State Party to enhance or broaden this necessary cultural legitimisa-
tion by way of an intercultural or cross-cultural dialogue about women’s 
rights. 
 11  Enhancing a dialogue to avoid a clash between 
women’s human rights and culture 
 In order to achieve a higher level of cultural acceptance of the norm of 
women’s equality, it is important to stimulate a dialogue between the 
State and international actors (for instance the CEDAW Committee), but 
also to promote and enhance a dialogue between the State and the main 
internal stakeholders, that is, religious leaders, community leaders and 
(women’s) NGOs. 118 Many academic commentators acknowledge that the 
only way out of a deadlock between opposite and fi xed positions about 
women’s human rights and culture is to engage in an intercultural or 
cross-cultural dialogue. 119 When one has to choose between, on the one 
hand, forcing some cultures to eradicate or abolish traditional practices 
that are deemed to violate women’s human rights (and will thereby most 
likely generate even more resistance), and on the other hand the posi-
tion of cultural relativism, in which moral or ethical values, including 
the values of women’s equality and dignity, no longer seem to have any 
 118  See the recommendations made by the CEDAW Committee in its Concluding 
Observations, as cited below in notes 123 and 124. 
 119  For example,  A.  Shachar ,  Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Diff erences and Women’s 
Rights ( Cambridge University Press ,  2001 ) ;  A.  Phillips ,  Multiculturalism without Culture , 
( Princeton University Press ,  2007 ) ; Nyamu, ‘How should human rights and develop-
ment respond to cultural legitimization’; and  A. A.  An-Na’im , ‘Problems of Universal 
Cultural Legitimacy’ in  A. A.  An-Na’im and  Francis M. Deng (eds.),  Human Rights in 
Africa. Cross Cultural Perspectives ( New York :  Brookings Institution ,  1990 ) 331–67 . 
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weight, the most eff ective and safe middle way seems to be to try to start 
understanding each other and speaking with each other.  In the words of 
Celestine Nyamu: ‘Th e non-abolitionist approach, therefore, calls for a 
non-hegemonic human rights practice that incorporates the two simul-
taneous processes of internal discourse and cross-cultural dialogue, in 
order to fi nd legitimacy for human rights principles within all cultures.’ 120 
Engaging in such a dialogue is also seen as the only way to guarantee that 
women’s voices are heard in the process of the implementation of human 
rights standards. 121 
 In its Concluding Observations, the CEDAW Committee oft en stresses 
the necessity of engaging in a dialogue with civil society about cultural 
changes that need to take place in order to put an end to discrimina-
tion against women. It ‘urges the State party to intensify co-operation in 
this regard with civil society organisations, women’s groups and com-
munity leaders, traditional and religious leaders, as well as teachers and 
the media’. 122 And it urges the State Party ‘to undertake such eff orts in 
co-ordination with a wide range of stakeholders, and involving all sectors 
of society, so as to facilitate social and cultural change and the creation of 
an enabling environment that is supportive of gender equality’. 123 
 In order to do so, States Parties need to interpret their culture and 
traditions in a non-essentialist and dynamic manner. In the words of 
a General Comment of the ESCR Committee: ‘Th e expression “cul-
tural life” is an explicit reference to culture as a living process, his-
torical, dynamic and evolving, with a past, a present and a future.’ 124 
Th is has also been acknowledged by the CEDAW Committee, 125 who 
 120  Nyamu, ‘How should human rights and development respond to cultural legitimization’ 
at 393. 
 121  Currently, this strategy is attracting more and more political and scholarly attention in 
all areas of legal pluralism or multilayered jurisdictions. See, for example, F.   Fontanelli , 
G. Martinico and P. Carrozza,  Shaping Rule of Law Th rough Dialogue. International and 
Supranational Experiences ( Groningen :  European Law Publishing ,  2009 ) . 
 122  CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Nigeria, CEDAW/C/NGA/6 (2008) 
para. 323. 
 123  CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Nicaragua, CEDAW/C/NIC/CO/6 
(2007) para. 12. 
 124  UN CESCR General Comment 21, 20 November 2009, UN DOC. E/C. 12/GC/21, 
para. 11. 
 125  Here again I disagree with Merry (‘Gender justice and CEDAW’), who states that the 
Convention and the Committee adhere to a static and essentialist view of culture and 
also use culture to describe other worlds, not their own. For a more detailed discussion 
on this issue, see Holtmaat and Naber,  Women’s Human Rights and Culture at para. 3.1. 
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in many Concluding Observations encourage States Parties to see cul-
ture as something that can be changed and that can (also) incorporate 
the human rights standards that are embodied in the Convention. An 
example of this stance can be found in a Concluding Observation on 
Jordan of 2007, where the Committee ‘urges the State party to view cul-
ture as a dynamic aspect of the country’s social fabric and life and there-
fore subject to change’. 126 
 12  Concluding remarks 
 Th is chapter argues that the Women’s Convention contains a holistic 
understanding of equality and that it includes the principle of freedom 
or diversity. On this basis, the Convention aims at eliminating all forms 
of discrimination against women by means of various strategies of legal, 
social and cultural reform. Especially in the last part of the chapter, it 
becomes clear that such reform meets with a lot of (oft en silent) resist-
ance, and sometimes even with a vehement call upon other values and 
rights, such as the right to sustain and support cultures, traditions and 
religions, however oppressive these may be for women. It is not enough 
that Article 5 off ers the legal legitimacy for the necessary changes in this 
respect; it is also required that States Parties and other stakeholders fi nd 
the roads to broaden and strengthen the necessary cultural legitimisation 
for the process of modifying gender stereotypes and fi xed parental gen-
der roles. Th anks to the existence of Article 5, the Women’s Convention 
is a revolutionary instrument that addresses the root causes of discrimi-
nation against women. However, in order for this instrument to become 
 126  CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Jordan (2007), CEDAW/C/EST/JOR/
CO/4, para. 20. See also CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Mozambique 
(2007), CEDAW/C/MOZ/CO/2, paras. 20 and 21 and CEDAW Committee, Concluding 
Observations: Cook Islands (2007), CEDAW/C/COK/CO/1, para. 23. We found a simi-
lar consideration for the fi rst time in CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: 
Angola (2004), A/59/38/CEDAW/C/SR. 655 and 661, para. 147. Th e Committee 
in its earlier days at some points went rather far in suggesting that a particular cul-
ture or religious practice or conviction can and should be changed. See, for exam-
ple, CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1974), 
A/49/38, CEDAW/C/SR.237 and 240, para. 130 and CEDAW Committee, Concluding 
Observations: Pakistan (2007), CEDAW/C/PAK/CO/3, para. 29. In the latter 
Concluding Observation the Committee ‘calls on the State party to take prompt action 
to counteract the infl uence of non-State actors, which, through the misinterpretation 
of Islam and the use of intimidation and violence, are undermining the enjoyment by 
women and girls of their human rights’. 
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eff ective, all stakeholders in the advancement of women’s human rights 
need to take steps in order to enhance the necessary cultural, social and 
legal changes. Improving the quality and eff ectiveness of transnational 
and local dialogues about women’s human rights and culture is an impor-
tant step in that direction. 
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